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Stepping Stone, Stopping Point, or Slippery Slope? 
Negotiating the Next Iran Deal (v. 3.0, 3/24/14) 
James K. Sebenius
1  
 
Abstract:  The November 2013 “interim” nuclear deal between Iran and the “P5+1”—the 
United States, Russia, China, Britain, France, and Germany—raises challenging questions. Will the 
initial deal function as a stepping stone toward a more comprehensive deal?  Or will it drift into 
becoming a stopping point that leaves Iran dangerously close to nuclear weapons capability with the 
sanctions regime in decline?  Or will it devolve to a slippery slope that would end up requiring a painful 
choice for key players between either acquiescing in a nuclear-capable Iran or attacking Iran’s nuclear 
facilities?  With the Iran and the P5+1 each splintered into contending factions, a successful stepping 
stone strategy requires converting enough “persuadable skeptics” on each side to forge a “winning 
coalition” on behalf of the a more comprehensive nuclear deal. This supportive group must be strong 
enough to overcome the potent “blocking coalition” that will oppose virtually any larger, next-stage 
agreement. The best chance for the interim accord to become a stepping stone to a more valuable deal 
calls for a two-prong negotiating strategy with both value-enhancing and cost-imposing elements.  The 
first prong of this strategy should strive to craft the most valuable possible next deal that credibly offers 
Iran a range of benefits, not limited to sanctions relief, that are greater and much more salient than those 
available from the interim agreement. The second prong should significantly worsen the consequences of 
failing to reach the next nuclear deal by a strong public U.S. Presidential commitment to sign a bill, 
prenegotiated with the Congress and P5+1 allies, imposing enhanced sanctions if negotiations toward an 
acceptable, but relatively narrow, agreement denying Iran an “exercisable nuclear option” do not 
succeed by the reasonable but firm deadline no later than twelve months from the start of the interim 
talks. 
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The “interim” nuclear deal with Iran has sparked bitter controversy. This agreement 
temporarily freezes or rolls back key elements of Iran’s nuclear program in return for six months 
of modest sanctions relief.
2 Yet, more than two months into negotiations to, predictions diverge 
sharply about where future negotiations will lead. 
 
Will the initial deal function as a stepping stone toward a more comprehensive deal in 
which fears of a nuclear-capable Iran justifiably recede, sanctions lift, and just conceivably, 
mutual enmity slowly subsides?   
 
Or will this first deal drift into becoming a stopping point that leaves Iran dangerously 
close to nuclear weapons capability with the sanctions regime in decline?  
 
Or will the interim deal devolve, perhaps from a temporary stopping point, to a slippery 
slope that would end up requiring a painful choice between two costly, risky outcomes: either 
acquiescing in a nuclear-capable Iran or attacking Iran’s nuclear facilities? 
 
Reaching a worthwhile next deal will be extremely tough. Deep interests and perceptions 
clash. Years of enmity and powerful blockers on all sides raise high barriers. Indeed, it is 
uncertain whether a set of deal terms even exists that would meet each side’s core interests well 
enough to attract sufficient support for acceptance. If such terms do not exist, even the most 
brilliant negotiating strategy won’t succeed.
3 But if an underlying zone of possible agreement 	 2
does exist, failing to uncover it as the result of a deficient process or insistence on unattainable 
terms would be tragic. 
 
With the Iran and the “P5+1”—the United States, Russia, China, Britain, France, and 
Germany—each splintered into contending factions, a successful stepping stone strategy requires 
converting enough “persuadable skeptics” on each side to forge a “winning coalition” on behalf 
of the next nuclear deal. This supportive group must be strong enough to overcome the potent 
“blocking coalition” that will oppose virtually any larger, next-stage agreement. 
 
Analysts differ on two main questions over which negotiating approach offers the best 
shot for the interim accord to become a stepping stone to a next deal. First, should tactics 
emphasize inducement and cooperation or pressure, especially through intensified sanctions?
4  
Second, in return for sanctions relief, should a fairly narrow deal with tight limits on Iran’s 
nuclear activities and strict verification measures be acceptable? Or should a broader deal be 
required that commits Iran to accept nuclear limits but also to end its support for terror, 
Hezbollah, Hamas, and Assad; to ensure better human rights practices, etc.
5 
  
Bottom line: the best shot for the interim accord to become a stepping stone to a more 
valuable deal calls for a two-prong negotiating strategy with both value-enhancing and cost-
imposing elements.  The first prong of this strategy should strive to craft the most valuable 
possible comprehensive nuclear deal that credibly offers Iran a range of benefits, not limited to 
sanctions relief, that are greater and more salient than those available from the interim 
agreement. The second prong should significantly worsen the consequences of failing to reach 
the next nuclear deal by a credible mechanism, described below, to impose enhanced sanctions if 
negotiations toward an acceptable, but relatively narrow, agreement do not succeed by a 
reasonable but firm deadline. 
 
How strenuously the parties negotiate and the risks they will take to reach the next deal 
depend on its perceived value. Analysts often fail to realize that this value depends not only on 
deal terms themselves but, critically, on the perceived no-deal alternative; that is, how the parties 
answer the question “the proposed deal—as compared to what?” The appeal of the next deal will 
be far greater if the no-deal outcome entails certainty of an enhanced sanctions regime rather 
than if no-deal means falling back on the interim accord as an easier stopping point—which 
could easily become a slippery slope.    
 
Hence the two-prong strategy’s emphasis on crafting the most valuable possible deal 
while worsening the no-deal outcome.  The challenges of effectively deploying both carrot and 
stick are real but common in difficult negotiations—and can most likely be surmounted by 
skillful diplomacy in the coming nuclear talks.   
 
The Next Deal: A Contest Among Skeptics.  Assembling a winning coalition in support 
of a larger deal requires disaggregating the “sides”—broadly, Iran versus the P5+1 and its 
putative allies on this issue such as Israel, Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf states. Complex internal 
alignments on each “side” are very much in play as a function of the character of the upcoming 
negotiation process as well as the terms of a more comprehensive deal. Oversimplifying, the 
nuclear talks have set up a contest involving three groups on each side: a cautious and 	 3
provisional “deal-favoring faction,” a larger group of “persuadable skeptics,” and a set of 
unconditional opponents of virtually any feasible next deal. 
 
First, each side now has a cautious and provisional “deal-favoring” faction.  For the 
Americans, this is the Obama administration plus key P5+1 members; for the Iranians, Rouhani 
and his current political supporters following his somewhat surprise election.  These factions 
largely provided the backing for the interim agreement but cannot, by themselves, provide 
sufficient support for a next deal. If the terms of the next agreement are right—and if this Iranian 
faction is sincere—these groups will work both with each other and with their respective sides in 
favor of the deal, mainly seeking to transform enough skeptics into supporters.   
 
Second, a much larger group of suspicious but “persuadable skeptics” on each side is 
inclined toward opposition, but ultimately is at least open to the possibility of a next deal that 
offers real benefits relative to impasse.  For this second group, as for the deal-favoring (first) 
faction, the interim agreement mainly provides a direct opportunity to test the other side’s real 
intentions after more than three decades with essentially no direct official communication 
(between the U.S. and Iran), mutual hostility, and polarization.  And test they will, especially 
whether each side observes the letter and spirit of the interim agreement.  Apart from the actual 
deal terms, these factions will relentlessly scrutinize the upcoming process for signs that the 
other side is serious . . . or not.   
 
Think of these potentially persuadable deal skeptics on both sides as the swing parties in 
a fierce contest between deal-favorers and a third group of unconditional opponents (described 
below).  A successful deal requires the support of enough Iranian skeptics to tip the internal 
political balance enough to make it more politically appealing, for Khamenei to agree if he 
ultimately so chooses—hardly a certainty. Similarly, if enough American, Israeli, and Saudi 
skeptics become supportive of or at least neutral toward the next deal, the Obama administration 
will find it much easier to successfully press for its acceptance.     
 
Iranian skeptics will watch for the other side’s genuine willingness to lift sanctions and 
provide benefits as well as to dial down hostile activities widely attributed to American and 
Israeli sources such as cyber-attacks, mysterious explosions, assassinations of nuclear scientists, 
and the like. Potentially supportive but skeptical P5+1 members as well as important groups of 
Israelis, Saudis, Gulf countries, and domestic U.S. players will shift from “mere” skeptics into 
outright opponents at serious signs of Iranian duplicity, diplomatic trench warfare, hostile 
domestic pronouncements, or cheating on the interim deal’s requirements (especially after Iran’s 
failure to comply with its 2003 nuclear deal with France, Germany, and the UK—and against the 
backdrop of frequent North Korean noncompliance with similar deals).  
 
The third faction, “deal blockers,” consists of unconditional opponents who sought to 
stop the interim deal and will fight virtually any larger accord in part by recruiting allies from the 
second faction of deal skeptics. If Ayatollah Khamenei ends up firmly into this group, he would 
serve as a one-man blocking coalition, and no deal would be possible.  It is difficult to 
disentangle blockers’ interests in a nuclear deal per se from their broader political interests.  In 
Iran, much of the Revolutionary Guard and many conservative clerics—already fighting a 
rearguard action against the interim deal
6—want to put a stop to Rouhani and his allies however 
the nuclear talks play out.  In Israel and the United States as well as among Gulf states, important 	 4
conservative groups will denounce “fatal flaws” both on the merits of almost any next deal and 
as a corollary to their ironclad belief that Obama is disastrously naïve and dangerous across his 
entire Middle Eastern policy.  
 
The First Prong of a Stepping Stone Strategy: Value-Enhancing Moves. A necessary 
condition for success is that the main substantive terms of the next deal meet the core interests of 
each faction of a potential winning coalition: tight limits on Iran’s nuclear activities, strict 
verification measures, substantial sanctions relief.  Unless an agreement does this and offers 
confidence that each side will comply, assembling a winning coalition from among deal-favorers 
and skeptics above in favor of a next agreement is virtually out of the question.  
 
Beyond these necessary conditions, several “first prong” actions could enhance the 
perceived value of the next deal relative to the costs of no deal.  Such actions could make these 
potential benefits more salient, cut against the hardline Iranian narrative, and increase the odds of 
enough persuadable skeptics joining a supportive coalition strong enough to overcome the 
blockers 
 
For 34 years with no diplomatic relations or official communication between the United 
States and Iran, hardliners in Tehran have portrayed the United States and its allies as 
implacable, interested only in sanctions and threats. (And these hostile perceptions, of course, 
have been mutual, caricatured as the “Great Satan vs. the Mad Mullahs.”
7) As a result, skeptics 
and blockers—both genuinely and cynically—can easily sow doubt that the U.S.-led coalition 
would ever deliver meaningful benefits as part of a nuclear deal.  
 
To counter this hostile narrative, the United States should orchestrate a far more 
persuasive campaign that targets potentially persuadable Iranian skeptics, helping to build the 
largest possible constituency for a deal.  
 
Given the potent negative effects of sanctions, lifting them in return for credible Iranian 
nuclear limits obviously ranks highest among value-enhancing actions.
8  During the first six 
months while the fuller deal is being negotiated, quite modest sanctions relief, doled out in 
carefully calibrated increments, is provided by the interim accord; the Administration says the 
figure is $7 billion worth of direct benefit to Iran, while some analysts say the direct and indirect 
effects are closer to a $24 billion boost to the Iranian economy. This action permits persuadable 
Iranian skeptics and other potential deal supporters to directly experience meaningful economic 
benefits—as has happened even in anticipation of the interim deal
9—with far more sanctions 
relief credibly available on a progressive basis under the right next deal. 
  
But U.S. negotiators should do more to dramatize the much larger potential benefits that 
would accrue to Iran with—but only with—the signing and implementation of a fuller deal.  
 
Oil sanctions relief would increase Iran’s oil output and global sales (placing downward 
pressure on world oil prices).  To make oil sanctions relief more publicly salient, negotiators 
should encourage international oil companies and other businesses to send well-publicized 
missions to Iran to demonstrate advanced technology and investment willingness.   
 	 5
High-profile measures could be undertaken to set up—conditional on a comprehensive 
deal—trade initiatives as well as technical, financial, and other assistance to agriculture, civil 
aviation (including spare parts), transport, telecommunication, and other non-oil sectors.  U.S. 
and European scientific teams could likewise be dispatched to explore potential areas of 
cooperation with Iranian scientists in non-nuclear fields.      
 
In the realm of regional policy, it may be useful to raise the possibility reactivating 
cooperation in areas of mutual benefit where both sides have showed genuine interest in the past.  
Examples include joint counter-narcotics activities, Afghan security, and anti-Taliban moves.  
Such actions could serve as the basis for cautiously exploring the potential for a wider and more 
constructive Iranian regional role. The idea would not be to expand the agenda of the interim 
talks, but to make more salient the possibility of acting on mutual interests.  Beyond these 
examples, there are many more potentially value-enhancing moves.
10   
 
In line with the idea of a campaign to dramatize the benefits of a comprehensive nuclear 
deal, several European countries, especially France and Germany, have sent business and trade 
missions to Teheran in anticipation of the end of sanctions.
11 For the most part, the Obama 
administration has strenuously opposed such commercial initiatives concerned that they would 
weaken the sanctions regime. (In a notable recent exception, which should be much more widely 
publicized, the administration authorized U.S. academic exchanges with Iranian universities.
12)   
 
While administration opposition is understandable, a coordinated campaign for Western 
companies and scientists to more visibly tout their wares in Iran could potently counter the 
hardline Tehran narrative. It could persuasively demonstrate that, given a deal, no Western 
agenda exists to frustrate Iran’s scientific progress or economic development. Targeting skeptics 
in this way would help mobilize potential supporters and isolate Iranian hardliners opposed to a 
deal.  
 
Such forthcoming actions would also help persuade allies that the United States is serious 
about diplomacy, something that will be important if negotiations fail and allied support is 
needed for tougher measures as set forth in “prong two” of the recommended approach. 
 
With proper planning and expectations-setting with P5+1 allies, such a campaign 
targeting skeptics need not undermine the sanctions regime.  Without a final nuclear deal, none 
of these tantalizing benefits for Iran would be realized. In Obama’s words, governments could 
still come down “like a ton of bricks” on sanctions violators.
13 
  
It is true that prior Iranian negotiators have shown scant interest in incentives beyond 
sanctions relief.
14  It may be that such incentives were viewed as mere hypothetical possibilities 
rather than real options. Yet, even if credible, one party’s genuine disinterest in incentives at an 
earlier stage of negotiations need not mean its later disinterest in the very same incentives, 
especially if that party’s no-deal options have been badly degraded in the interim as has been the 
case for Iran, especially with tightening oil, financial, and central bank sanctions since 2010.   
By analogy, the potential acquirer of a business firm may initially offer substantial 
inducements to its founder/CEO—who may indignantly reject such payments and other offers.  
One might reasonably conclude that the CEO has “no interest in such incentives.”  Yet, suppose 	 6
the acquirer goes into the stock market and buys a large block of the target’s shares, credibly 
threatening the founder with loss of control.  Although contemptuously rejected earlier, renewed 
(identical) offers of substantial cash and a future role may now be keenly interesting to the 
founder/CEO in return for a “friendly” deal . . . given his dramatically worse no-deal options.  So 
too, with a sanctions-damaged Iranian regime that earlier scoffed at incentives.  (Plus, some of 
the key parties have changed with Rouhani’s election.  New players may value the identical 
incentives differently from earlier Iranian negotiators. And, if the interim deal is implemented, 
the credibility of future incentives would be enhanced.) 
 
Caution: offering beneficial deal terms that may help the hardline regime ensure its 
survival—for example by fostering oil production or offering security guarantees—can be 
morally problematic and politically costly as can giving the perception of an Iranian “victory” or 
appearing to reward bad behavior.  Thus, along with their appeal to persuadable skeptics in Iran, 
candidate incentives should be assessed in terms of how costly—in political, economic, security, 
and/or moral terms—such measures would be to persuadable skeptics among the P5+1 block.  
The trick is to find and emphasize those benefits of highest value (for recruiting Iranian skeptics) 
at lowest cost (to pro-next deal efforts among the U.S. and its allies).  
 
Prong Two: Conditional Sanctions to Prevent Stopping Point and Slippery Slope 
Outcomes.  In addition to wooing skeptics, a winning strategy must thwart determined Iranian 
blockers who seek a nuclear capability and will try to prevent meaningful concessions. After six 
months of talks, there could easily be positive atmospherics but little real progress. P5+1 and 
Iranian diplomats could seductively request “just a bit more time since we’re locked in intense 
negotiations that promise imminent breakthroughs.” Relative to the prospect of escalating 
hostilities, many factions on each side will view the interim deal as preferable—with key 
elements of the Iranian nuclear program (reversibly) paused or rolled back and some sanctions 
relief. 
 
This possibility has led to predictions by sophisticated analysts about a likely six-month 
extension of the talks, an option built into the interim deal.
15  This “drift” could easily become an 
indefinite pattern, turning some version of the interim deal into a de facto stopping point. 
Meanwhile, as the process continues, Western companies continue to lobby their governments to 
permit Iranian contracts, the will of allies to support sanctions erodes, diplomatic focus shifts, 
and Iran’s nuclear program quietly advances.  
 
Already, evidence has mounted of sanctions-evading Turkish “gold for gas” efforts as 
well as a potentially $1.5 billion per month “oil for goods” deal between Iran and Russia.16  As 
Ali Akbar Salehi, head of Iran's nuclear agency, said on state television about the effects of the 
interim deal, "The iceberg of sanctions is melting while our centrifuges are also still working."
17  
 
Former Secretary of State James Baker wisely observed of his allied coalition-building 
negotiations to unify Germany within NATO and to eject Saddam Hussein from Kuwait: putting 
such coalitions together was “difficult” but maintaining them was “plenty difficult.” Many 
people, Baker presciently said, “repeatedly underestimated the difficulty of holding the coalition 
together for an extended period.  Eventually, a key partner was likely to bolt, in which case the 
coalition would likely disintegrate.” The interim deal with Iran helped hold the P5+1 together by 
demonstrating genuine willingness to reach agreement; focusing on value-creating moves during 	 7
the negotiations will help further.  However, more is needed to serve as a bulwark against the 
inevitable pressures for the Iran sanctions coalition to fragment if the interim deal increasingly 
looks like a stopping point.  
 
If the first prong of the two-prong strategy is designed to make the value of a deal high 
enough to tempt skeptics into a winning coalition, the second prong would make the failure to 
reach an acceptable comprehensive deal far more costly.  For this, the negotiations need a 
credible deadline backed by meaningful consequences.  Solemn verbal pronouncements by 
multiple American administrations and their allies about firm deadlines—easily seen as “cheap 
talk”—won’t do it. Such declarations can lack credibility given years of steadily receding “red 
lines”—more and more advanced stages in the Iranian nuclear program that the United States 
and its allies first declared to be unacceptable . . . and then, when Iran crossed those red lines, 
effectively accepted as a fait accompli.
18   
 
To boost its credibility – and to help with its own domestic and allied skeptics -- the 
administration should pre-negotiate a harsh new “contingency” sanctions package
19 with 
Congress and work hard to ensure buy-in from U.S. allies. But instead of signing the sanctions 
bill immediately, Obama should—at an appropriate pause point in the ongoing talks—publicly 
and forcefully commit to signing it if there is no acceptable agreement (described below) no later 
than the end of one, six-month extension of the interim deal. The right kind of contingent 
sanctions bill passed with deep bipartisan support, coupled with a strong public presidential 
commitment to sign it by a specific date, will enhance U.S. credibility, highlight the very real 
downsides for Iran of no deal, and make it harder for blockers to gain traction in Tehran.   
 
The Obama administration wisely and successfully opposed a recent sanctions bill 
sponsored by Sen. Robert Menendez (D-N.J.) and Sen. Mark Kirk (R-I.L.).  Their “Nuclear 
Weapon Free Iran Act of 2013” usefully included the concept of “contingent sanctions,” but 
went far beyond essential nuclear objectives, entailing a high risk of overly stringent, deal-killing 
requirements.
20 The Obama administration and a number of experienced U.S. diplomats argued 
that it would end negotiations by violating at least the spirit of the interim deal (which rules out 
new sanctions during negotiations
21), souring the atmosphere, and playing into the hardline 
narrative.
22 Opponents of the bill were right to oppose its excessive requirements but wrong to 
miss the potential of more credible contingent sanctions. 
 
Many members of Congress, both Republican and Democratic, as well as influential 
Israeli, Saudi, French, and other allies do not see contingent sanctions as mere bargaining tactics 
or posturing, but as vital elements of a bargaining strategy, a “diplomatic insurance policy” in the 
words of Menendez.
23 The Obama administration and its deal-favoring allies, while eager to 
avoid enhanced sanctions as an outcome of the interim negotiations, should capitalize on the 
potential forcing value of an appropriate form of contingent measures.  
 
Thoughtful observers would likely contend that even contingent sanctions of the form 
proposed here would run real risks with the interim negotiations.
24 Iranian negotiators will surely 
claim bad faith in any “threatening” moves toward contingent sanctions and may well walk out, 
at least temporarily.  Yet if the benefits of a deal are high, the costs of no-deal are substantial, 
and the diplomatic process is respectful and focused on the positive, it is doubtful that such 
action will be fatal to negotiation. 	 8
 
After all, if the atmosphere of the interim negotiations would be at great risk due to 
explicit threats of harsher sanctions should the talks fail, both by the President and Secretary of 
State would have already blown it by what they’ve publicly said. For example, as President 
Obama stated in December 2013, if Iran can’t give “assurances that [they are] not going to 
weaponize, if they’re not willing to address some of their capabilities that we know could end up 
resulting in them having breakout capacity, it’s not going to be hard for us to turn the dials back, 
strengthen sanctions even further.  I’ll work with members of Congress to put even more 
pressure on Iran. . . . the Iranians will know that if negotiations fail even new and harsher 
sanctions will be put into place.”25 Secretary Kerry similarly declared that “as we negotiate, we 
will continue to be perfectly clear that, for Iran, the price of noncompliance, of failing to satisfy 
international concerns about the nuclear program, will be that we immediately ratchet up new 
sanctions, along with whatever further steps are needed to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear 
weapon, including  . . . a military option, if that were necessary.”26 
 
As these statements make clear, the real negotiating problem is not atmosphere-
jeopardizing threats.  A deeper problem is their credibility, especially the lack of any forcing 
mechanism such as a specific deadline. The recommended contingent sanctions bill passed with 
deep bipartisan support, coupled with a strong public presidential commitment to sign it by a 
specific date would go a long way toward remedying this problem. 
 
In their role as the “good cops” fighting the inevitability of contingent sanctions by 
crafting a good deal, the P5+1 negotiators should relentlessly devise and stress the benefits of a 
“yes,” though in the dark shadow of enhanced sanctions in the event of failure.  It is hardly 
beyond the finesse of skilled diplomats to persuasively highlight and offer the positives while 
soberly warning—not explicitly threatening the other side—of the negatives of failure to 
conclude at least a narrow nuclear deal. However, for this second prong of the strategy to prevent 
stopping point or slippery slope outcomes, while still promoting the next agreement, four 
conditions should be met: 
 
First, where at all possible, the imposition of such contingent sanctions should be legally 
binding on the United States, which should negotiate as much advance buy-in of the P5+1 as can 
be achieved. Negotiators hate to have their hands tied, but this is a case where doing so should be 
a forcing device against those who would be content with, or even favor, multiple extensions of 
the interim deal if a comprehensive deal proves elusive. Without a deadline and worse 
alternatives to failure, the odds rise steeply of the interim deal becoming a stopping point or 
worse. 
 
Second, the triggering deadline should be realistic, allowing time to negotiate the genuine 
technical complexities involved and to build internal support on all sides for the larger deal—but 
not for time-consuming posturing. The outer time limit should be the one-year expiration of the 
contemplated six-month extension. 
 
Third, the requirements that the next deal must meet to avoid triggering enhanced 
sanctions must be appropriately crafted.  A too-specific list of necessary provisions may block 
creative diplomacy that could otherwise meet core P5+1 interests.  Instead of detailed specifics, 
the next deal should limit Iran’s potentially military nuclear capabilities sufficiently to satisfy a 	 9
clear “necessary criterion” that it verifiably prevents Iran from advancing toward a military 
nuclear option without being detected well in advance. Graham Allison characterizes a useful 
version of this criterion as an “exercisable nuclear option.”
27  The trigger should not go beyond 
this core interest in the ways that the Menendez-Kirk bill did.  It should not require major 
changes in Iran’s non-nuclear behavior as some analysts urge.
28 Instead, the administration and 
its allies should work with bill sponsors to set the enhanced sanctions trigger no higher than 
necessary to meet the above necessary criterion.  
 
Fourth, to avoid triggering such sanctions, a mechanism could usefully be devised to 
“certify” the next deal as meeting the necessary criterion.  At a minimum, the President would 
have to make such a certification.  Here are some other mechanism possibilities in addition to a 
required Presidential finding:  the International Atomic Energy Agency might be required to 
declare that all of its outstanding questions about Iran’s nuclear programs had been satisfactorily 
answered and that Iran’s current program was verifiably peaceful.  Further, an expert bipartisan 
panel of former national security officials might be required to concur.  Upon review of the next 
deal, a suitable majority vote, say two-thirds of the Senate, might be sufficient to overturn the 
Presidential determination and thereby trigger the enhanced sanctions. 
 
Designed properly, such certifications -- coupled with the administration’s likely 
unexpected decision to work proactively with Congress on contingent sanctions -- would also 
help reassure U.S. and allied skeptics, who worry that the administration is too soft. (Indeed, 
after the administration and its allies defeated the Menendez-Kirk bill, 83 Senators and 394 
House members wrote the administration urging tough conditions for an acceptable deal.
29) 
 
Such carefully structured contingent enhanced sanctions should be compatible with 
cooperative negotiations toward a comprehensive deal.  Much of the opposition to the 
Menendez-Kirk bill was aimed not at the concept of contingent sanctions but at its specific 
“deal-killing” requirements which were too detailed, too stringent, too expansive, and likely 
unachievable. To function properly, the trigger criterion and mechanism would have to be 
appropriately modified (as suggested above).  But when both the President and Secretary of 
State, have in effect threatened Iran with contingent enhanced sanctions if negotiations do not 
produce a satisfactory result, the risk of a more specific threat, if suitably focused on narrow 
nuclear objectives, does not appear significant relative to the negotiating benefits.    
 
It is true that when economically “coercive diplomacy” effectively requires one side to 
capitulate with a major loss of face, it risks failure as many overly confident hawks have 
discovered.
30  To emphasize commitment to a mutually valuable next deal, the Obama 
administration should balance its dealings with Congress over contingent enhanced sanctions 
with a strong request for contingent enhanced incentives of the kind discussed in “prong one” of 
this recommended strategy.  The focus of prong one is not about capitulation, face loss, and 
humiliation.  Rather its substance and style focus on realizing significant, salient mutual gains.  
These would come about if and when Iran finally validates and provides verification of the 
genuinely peaceful nature of their nuclear program—to the satisfaction of the international 
community.  Of course, the regime has steadfastly and publicly affirmed this to be the case along 
with its purported (religious) opposition to ever obtaining nuclear weapons. 
 	 10
If negotiators can keep the focus on credible mutual gain from the next deal (prong one), 
albeit with credible negative consequences in the event of failure (prong two), the chances of 
success rise.  After all, bargaining “in the shadow of the law” often produces results where 
bargaining without significant consequences of failure can promote endless stalling and 
inconclusive results.  Facing the prospect of a strike or hostile takeover can catalyze the 
negotiations toward agreement.  In the Iran case, a realistic deadline for a sensible, mutually 
beneficial deal in the shadow of conditionally enhanced sanctions would serve as a much milder 
“warning” version of Richard Holbrooke’s “bomb and talk” approach to Slobodan Milosovic 
leading to the Dayton accords that ended the Bosnian war. 
 
Why Not Maximum Pressure for a Maximum Deal? Why adopt this two-prong strategy 
with both value-enhancing and contingent cost-imposing elements aimed at reaching a narrow 
nuclear deal?  Why not go for a broader agreement? And why not keep up the pressure of 
sanctions? In short, why not maximum pressure for a maximum deal (like President Reagan 
used, arguably as a key to success, when dealing with the Soviets in the 1980s INF talks?)
31   
 
There is considerable evidence that sanctions have imposed a heavy economic burden on 
Iran and have served as powerful prods for serious negotiation. Their actual effects, whether they 
are “crippling,” and whether they will force Iran’s leadership to accede to maximalist demands, 
are far less clear.
32  In general, economic sanctions have a mixed record of success—including 
even harsh, sustained ones against Cuba and North Korea—especially where the elite can avoid 
their effects and the sanctioning coalition springs leaks.
33  This should caution against 
overplaying our hand in Iran when there may be a real opening.   
 
It is simply unclear whether continued full sanctions would induce Iranian capitulation.  
Given the reasonable chance that they are not, continuing to impose sanctions risks persuading 
Iranian skeptics that their hardliners’ narrative is correct (that the U.S. and its allies are only 
interested in threats, sanctions, and pressure).  As such, the interim nuclear opening may close 
before it can be meaningfully tested and before Iranian support can be built for greater benefits 
of an acceptable next deal.  In this case, continued sanctions would represent a big, uncovered 
bet on the power of continuing sanctions that would have led to a dangerous slippery slope.  This 
would be a bad move. 
 
Now suppose that sanctions are strong enough to eventually induce Iranian capitulation.  
With a credible mechanism in place to impose even stronger ones in the event that negotiations 
fail (prong two of the recommended strategy), it would be possible to test Iranian intentions, 
make the benefits of the next deal more salient and persuasive to skeptics, but in the shadow or a 
much worse no-deal option.   
 
In short, given the real possibility that sanctions won’t force capitulation, deferring their 
imposition offers a useful hedge (if they won’t) and a more powerful incentive (if they will).   
 
A similar logic applies to the related question of whether to walk away from a narrower 
nuclear next deal if broader agreement can’t be reached that contains other highly desirable 
provisions (e.g., for Iran to dismantle its entire nuclear infrastructure; to drop support for Assad, 
Hezbollah, and Hamas; to confess all past terror-related sins; to improve its human rights record; 
etc.).   	 11
 
Start with the observation that preventing a nuclear-capable or nuclear-armed Iran is 
singularly important, has been a vital focus of American foreign policy, and affects most other 
Iran-related issues.  By many accounts, even doing a narrow nuclear deal is an iffy proposition 
given the power of Iranian skeptics and hardliners, the importance the regime has evidently 
attached to nuclear capability, and the prospect of Iran obtaining that capability.
34  To insist on 
wider provisions on yet other issues of importance to various constituencies risks overburdening 
the deal and energizing a larger set of skeptics. This could imperil a supportive coalition behind 
an acceptable nuclear deal, risking an extremely important, if narrower, accord.
35  While other 
key interests in the Iran file will be the focus of ongoing efforts for years to come, one should not 
let hopes for a comprehensive dream deal scupper a good nuclear one.  The United States and its 
allies will find it far more effective to address these Iranian issues if Iran has no nukes. 
   
And of course, if the narrower deal can be reached that denies Iran an exercisable nuclear 
option, future diplomacy should certainly seek to build on it to encompass other issues.  From 
another context, the counsel of former Secretary of State James Baker again seems apt: “you 
need to crawl before you walk and walk before you run.”
36  
 
Scarcely more than fifty years ago, President Kennedy faced what many of his advisors 
saw as an inescapable choice between two terrible options: acquiescing in Soviet nuclear 
weapons on Cuba, ninety miles from U.S. shores, or attacking Cuba at the very real risk of 
triggering a nuclear exchange that would snuff out tens of millions of American, Cuban, and 
Soviet lives.  Yet, as Graham Allison detailed in teasing out possible parallels to the Iranian 
nuclear talks, Kennedy crafted an ingenious way out.
37 After an American blockade bought vital 
time, Kennedy offered Khrushchev 1) a public pledge not to invade Cuba if missiles were 
removed (Khrushchev could tell his hardliners that “we safeguarded our ally’s revolution”), 2) 
tacit willingness to remove (obsolete) missiles from a U.S. base in Turkey within six months 
(Khrushchev could say “we won comparable concessions to removing Soviet missiles”), but 3) a 
private threat to attack within 24 hours if Soviet missiles weren’t removed (a worsened no-deal 
option without public loss of face). “Acquiesce or attack” proved a false choice. The huge 
benefit was Soviet missiles out of Cuba; the costs included leaving a Communist puppet regime 
in Cuba and strained relations with Turkey, a U.S. ally.  
 
Can a similar approach be crafted for the Iranian nuclear challenge?  The interim deal 
temporarily freezes or rolls back key elements of Iran’s nuclear program while buying valuable 
time to address the real complexities of a more comprehensive deal and permit advocates on 
each side to enlist the support of persuadable skeptics.  Yet, without a credible deadline and high 
costs to impasse, that interim deal risks becoming a dangerous stopping point or slippery slope.  
To give it the best chance to serve as a stepping stone to a larger agreement, deal advocates 
should do their utmost to ensure that both sides adhere to the letter and spirit of the interim 
accord.  And for any chance of acceptability, the terms of the next deal must meet the essential 
needs of each party.   
 
Beyond these necessary conditions, negotiators should adopt a two-prong approach: 
crafting the most valuable possible nuclear deal while credibly worsening the consequences of 
no-deal. This will equip Iranian advocates to make a persuasive internal “victory speech” about 
why it is smarter and more valuable to say “yes” rather than knuckling under to, or defying, the 	 12
reality of outside pressure.  Even substantively modest but publicly salient incentives may be 
helpful ingredients in crafting that “speech” to strengthen and enlarge the pro-deal constituency 
in Iran.  At the same time, if their P5+1 counterparts can make an equivalent appeal to their own 
skeptics, a sufficient winning coalition on behalf of a fuller deal just may emerge that will be 
strong enough to overcome the blockers. 
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